





Title of thesis: THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON 
KURDISH TERRORISM IN TURKEY 1987-2011: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS 
 
 Daren Geoffrey Fisher, Master of Arts, 2014 
 
Thesis directed by: Professor Laura J. Dugan 
 Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
 
 
Natural disasters and terrorism present major challenges in their aftermath to a state and 
its populace, and help to define the identity of nations (Flynn, 2008). Destructive in their 
own right, previous research has argued that natural disasters also provide the catalyst for 
acts of terrorism (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011), complicating the role that state actions 
hold in response to a natural disaster. Responses to natural disasters by a state however 
vary (Perry and Lindell, 2003), and this thesis posits that the response to a natural disaster 
presents a unique situation for a state, through perceived adequacy of its response, to alter 
the rational incentives for a group to engage in subsequent terrorism. Using Turkey 
between 1987 and 2011 as a case study, these data suggest that the perceived adequacy of 
a response to a natural disaster is inversely associated with ethno-nationalist terrorism 
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Social and economic pressures have led to urbanization across the globe, 
rendering societies vulnerable to the consequences of both natural disasters and human 
attack (Kennedy, 2002). While increasing efficiency of resource distribution and 
resilience to infrastructure failures, high population density has also been connected with 
increased vulnerability to large-scale disasters (Kennedy, 2002). Beyond implementing 
legislation to limit population density in strategically vulnerable areas, the state plays a 
critical role in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from both person-made and 
natural disasters (NAS, 2002; Waugh, 2006). Though differing in cause, the effects of all 
disasters require a state to act promptly and effectively to mitigate negative consequences 
both during the event and in the aftermath (Galea, Nandi, and Vlahov, 2005). Waugh 
(2006) emphasizes that following a disaster, a state has an explicit responsibility to 
identify what went wrong and how it can improve its emergency management system 
before the next major natural disaster or ‘catastrophic terrorist attack’. A state’s real or 
perceived failure in this duty to its populace can magnify the disaster’s economic, 
political, and social costs, triggering long-term negative consequences for a state and its 
citizenry (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos, and Tarlow, 1999; Perry and Lindell, 2003; Waugh, 
2006). 
Terrorist acts are deliberate, willful, and criminal, whereas natural disasters such 
as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods are motivationally neutral. Despite these 
differences in antecedent factors, numerous similarities dictate how a state should prepare 
for and respond to both acts of terrorism and natural disasters in order to mitigate harm 
(NAS, 2002; Rose, 2009; Perrow, 2011). While seemingly distinct phenomena, the 
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academic community has begun to merge the study of natural disasters and terrorism 
within the domain of ‘emergency events’ (Zhuang and Bier, 2007; Rose, 2009; Perrow, 
2011). Recognized through the creation of new journals such as the Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management, there is increasing recognition that the study of all 
disaster types within a single domain will provide a more accurate and comprehensive 
understanding of these phenomena (Rose, 2009). In addition to these similarities in 
conceptual treatment and the resultant negative consequences, natural disasters may also 
provide the catalyst for acts of terrorism—further complicating this vital role that state 
actions hold in the response to natural disasters (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011). Moreover, 
the shock inherent in the aftermath of a natural disaster may also exacerbate existing 
tensions that exist between a populace (any in-group) and the state (out-group) (Berrebi 
and Ostwald, 2011). While few others have assessed the relationship between state 
responses to natural disasters and subsequent terrorism, any potential link between these 
two phenomena warrants further exploration given the magnitude of harm that is 
generated via terrorist actions. If such a link indeed exists, a state will need to make 
additional efforts to mitigate harm during and after a natural disaster to avoid a self-
perpetuating cycle of disasters or spiral of conflict (Shomer, Davis, and Kelley, 1966; 
Rummel, 1991).  
The diminished security capacity of the state in the wake of a natural disaster has 
been suggested by the existing literature as the reason for this link. Due to the softening 
of potential targets through the reallocation of resources, this has been presented as an 
opportunity for terrorist organizations to exploit (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011). Berrebi 
and Ostwald do question the efficacy of this explanation however because of potential 
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resentment engendered in those affected by the disaster, and offer a list of other potential 
explanations for why disasters would increase the risk of terrorist attacks. As the impact 
of a natural disaster is not purely the result of the physical occurrence and is heavily 
influenced by a state’s response (Waugh, 2006), this thesis offers a new argument 
claiming that the adequacy of the response to natural disasters could incense grievances 
that might affect the risk of terrorism. As governments, in many cases, underinvest in 
both their preparedness and response to natural disasters in areas that are perceived as 
hostile (Cohen and Werker, 2008), inadequate responses in marginalized geographic 
areas can be viewed as a manifestation of this hostility, and lead to an increase in the 
utility of subsequent terrorism. Further, the use of resources in response to a natural 
disaster in other more politically favored areas of the state may incite acts of terrorism 
due to the perceived disparity in treatment. Particularly in cases where these resources 
were previously allocated for geographically marginalized areas that are more vulnerable 
to the removal of these resources (Kinzer, 1999), the state response to a natural disaster 
may exacerbate existing political and cultural strains within a nation and thus lead to 
terrorism. 
Following from this reasoning, natural disasters would only incite terrorist attacks 
if the aggrieved marginalized group has an existing tie to a terrorist organization. If true, 
the relationship between natural disasters and terrorism should not exist in all nations, 
and will vary depending on the relationship to geographically marginalized and hostile 
areas. Seeking to explore how government actions in response to a natural disaster 
influences future acts of terrorism for these distinct types of terrorist threats, this thesis 
posits that terrorist organizations that support a geographically and ethnically isolated 
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constituency that is economically dependent on the central government are more reactive 
to the government’s response to natural disasters. In order to explore the relationship 
between natural disasters, the adequacy of the government’s response, and subsequent 
terrorism within Turkey, autoregressive Poisson regression models are used. 
1.1 Overview of the Present Study 
This thesis examines the relationship between natural disasters, the adequacy of 
state responses, and subsequent terrorism using the years from 1987 to 2011 in Turkey as 
a relevant case study. In addition to being the setting for numerous natural disasters and 
terrorist attacks, Turkey was selected as a case study due to the nature of its ongoing 
conflict with terrorist organizations linked to the Kurdish people. As the Kurdish people 
primarily inhabit the more mountainous and economically marginalized southeast of 
Turkey (Natali, 2005), their geographic isolation provides an ideal context to evaluate 
whether the relationship between natural disasters and subsequent terrorism is consistent 
across terrorism types and geographic locations within a nation. For natural disasters that 
occur in areas associated with the identity of a constituency, an inadequate government 
response may serve to aggravate existing grievances in addition to increasing the 
vulnerability created by the inaccessibility of vital resources. While other types of 
terrorism exist within Turkey, the constituencies of Islamist and Leftist terrorist 
organizations were not socially marginalized or geographically concentrated to the extent 
of the Kurdish people during this period. As such, it follows that government responses 
should not have had an impact on terrorism committed by these groups as the response 
may not be connected to the identity of a specific terrorist constituency. These factors, 
combined with the political history of Turkey that will subsequently be discussed, render 
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it plausible that the adequacy of the Turkish government’s response to a natural disaster 
may only be relevant for Kurdish terrorism within Turkey.  
Expanding upon the ideas of Waugh (2006), this thesis proposes that in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster a state’s response can either support or diminish the 
rational justification for subsequent acts of terrorism. If the state is unable to adequately 
support its people in a time of crisis such as a natural disaster, terrorism exists as a means 
for addressing this grievance against a state by communicating a strong political message 
(Crenshaw, 1981). As such, through mitigating the harm incurred by its populace from a 
natural disaster, the rational incentive to engage in an act of terrorism against a state 
would be undermined. Further, if it is perceived to have prepared adequately or has 
previously responded well to similar events, the justification for acts of terrorism may 
also be eroded through this process.  
Drawing upon the framework of Rational Choice theory, this thesis also 
specifically observes that rational choice can operate at the group level where groups of 
people may bond together to act in their collective interests (Olsen, 1971; 1982; 
Goodwin, 2012). This is congruent with much of the extant literature regarding terrorism 
which has indicated that the long-term survival of terrorist organizations, their recruiting 
practices, selection of tactics, and strategic foci are all influenced by decision-making 
processes that are not reducible to any single individual (McCormick, 2003; Brym and 
Araj, 2006; Kavanagh, 2011; Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012). As decisions regarding 
terrorist behavior are most often made as an organization and are subject to a number of 
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dynamic political pressures (McCormick, 2003; Goodwin, 2012), rational choice for the 
purposes of this thesis should be understood at the group level.  
This study will be the first to look at how the adequacy of a state’s response to a 
given disaster impacts future acts of terrorism. Earlier research on this topic has posited 
that government attention to the aftermath of a natural disaster functions as a mechanism 
reducing the perceived cost for a terrorist organization associated with a subsequent act 
of terrorism (through target softening) (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011). Heeding Goodwin’s 
(2012) advice to avoid overgeneralizations by considering reasons why terrorist 
organizations may also refrain from violent actions, this thesis also considers cases where 
a natural disaster may not lead to subsequent terrorism. As the response to a natural 
disaster by a population is not consistent across events within a nation however (Perry 
and Lindell, 2003), this observed association might not be solely due to the presence or 
absence of natural disasters. Instead of viewing natural disasters as target softening 
influences that lead to subsequent terrorism, this thesis argues that it is the government’s 
response to a natural disaster that alters the rational incentives to engage in subsequent 
acts of terrorism. Thus, if a state is unable to respond to the needs of its people in the 
wake of a disaster, the potential benefits of terrorism will increase as the political 
incentives for engaging in terrorism would be magnified. Also contrary to the 
generalizations advanced by Berrebi and Ostwald (2011), this dynamic should only apply 
to terrorist organizations that have a vested interest in the well-being of their 
geographically isolated and economically dependent constituency – people who are 
particularly affected when a disaster strikes. As such, the findings of this study may be 
relevant to other ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups; which include those with 
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links to the Saharawi within Morocco, the Kashmiri within India, and the Afars people 
within Eritrea, each of whom have high levels of geographic concentration comparable to 
the Kurdish people (Natali, 2005; Hoffman, 2006, MAR, 2013).  
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2. Rational Choice 
Built on the proposition that human actors are inherently rational and seek in all 
actions to maximize their own net utility, theories of rational choice are often viewed as 
central to understanding criminality and to justifying criminal justice responses (Pilivian, 
Thornton, Gartner, and Matsueda, 1986). Drawing deeply upon the work of Bentham 
(1780/2007) and Beccaria (1764/1963), the justification for the formation of societies and 
the introduction of laws to govern a society rely heavily on this assumption of rationality; 
Some tangible motives had to be introduced, therefore to prevent the 
despotic spirit, which is in every man, from plunging the laws of society 
into its original chaos... It was, thus, necessity that forced men to give up 
part of their personal liberty, and it is certain, therefore, that each is 
willing to place in the public fund only the least possible portion, no more 
than suffices to induce others to defend it (Beccaria, 1764/1963:12-13) 
Under this proposition it would be irrational for an individual to sacrifice their 
liberty unless the state is able to provide other tangible benefits that outweigh these costs 
(Brandt, 1995). For example, it may be rational for an individual to sacrifice their 
freedom to ingest illicit substances in exchange for personal protection, adequate health 
care, and access to infrastructure. Thus from a rational choice perspective, any state that 
is unable to offset the perceived cost of being subject to its laws should expect deviation 
from these laws (Beccaria, 1764). Further this thesis argues that if a state restricts the full 
privileges of citizenship to only a subset of its populace, then it should expect those who 
have been excluded to deviate from these laws. Following the lead of previous scholars 
who have claimed that terrorists are rational actors (LaFree and Ackerman, 2009; Dugan 
and Chenoweth, 2012), terrorism exists as one of the plethora of rational options open to 
the individual who is unable to derive adequate utility from membership to a state. 
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As outlined above, this thesis adopts an understanding of Rational Choice theory 
that posits that rational choice may also operate at the group level. This assertion is 
common within the terrorism literature, and this has been echoed in the literature 
surrounding the decision-making process of terrorist organizations (McCormick, 2003; 
Brym and Araj, 2006; Kavanagh, 2011). This thesis posits that policies that 
systematically exclude people from the benefits of citizenship, such as inadequate support 
in the wake of a natural disaster natural disasters (Waugh, 2006), present forms of 
motivation that could further provoke marginalized individuals to abandon their 
individual self-interests in lieu of the rational priorities of the group that encompasses 
them. Specifically, the perceived adequacy of a government’s response to a natural 
disaster can motivate established terrorist groups to respond with violence. As such, 
terrorism in the wake of a natural disaster can be seen as a rational response, even in 
cases when it appears to be irrational for those who commit the act. 
The notion of external pressures conditioning terrorism as a rational response has 
been observed as being pointedly relevant to understanding terrorism more broadly 
(Hutchison, 1972; Crenshaw, 1991; Pape, 2003). While part of the theoretical 
understanding for the motivation acts of terrorism, the precipitating stressors in every 
case will not always be evident. Particularly in cases where a long temporal interval 
exists between the coercive act and the subsequent act of terrorism, ‘coercers remain 
unaware of the connection between what they have done and what looks to them like 
unrelated willful opposition’ (Sidman, 2003:88). Particularly in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster, rational reactions by terrorist groups take time to come to fruition due to the 
disruption of access to resources and forms of social support (Kaniasty and Norris, 2004). 
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As such, the antagonistic actions that generated the impetus for an act of terrorism may 
not be immediately evident nor appear explicitly malicious in nature, as may be the case 
in a government’s response to a natural disaster (Kavanagh, 2011). Additionally, a state’s 
practices in a geographically separate region may also exacerbate existing grievances and 
provoke subsequent acts of terrorism. This will be further discussed later within the 
Turkish context. These temporal delays and the geographic profiles of a nation may make 
it difficult for a state to both identify itself as the source of coercion and associate itself to 
the rational response of a subsequent act of terrorism (Kavanagh, 2011). As it is unclear 
within the present literature how long the lag may be between government actions and 
subsequent terrorism, a variety of lags are tested in the present analysis (Appendix A) in 
order to observe how long this process might take in the aftermath of a natural disaster. 
As the state’s response to a natural disaster is unlikely to be consistently effective 
across disasters, not all disasters will incite a terrorist response. Indeed, this thesis posits 
that when disaster management and relief efforts are perceived as being properly 
coordinated the result will be positive social outcomes that could lead to altruistic actions 
within the impacted communities (Perry and Lindell, 2003). Social support mobilized 
through this process for example often occurs in spite of ‘previous community conflicts 
and race, ethnic, and social class barriers’, and may engender subsequent altruistic 
actions within the impacted area (Kaniasty and Norris, 2004). Rather than leading to 
target softening alone (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011), the response to a natural disaster may 
also stimulate positive social and cultural outcomes for the relationship between a state 
and its populace.  Consequently, the response to a natural disaster may present a unique 
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situation for a state to alter the rational incentives for a group to engage in a subsequent 
terrorist action particularly in light of previous hostility. 
Based on the above framework, one might expect that democracies that 
incorporate multiple points of view and socialize with out-groups (Hale, 1923; Sampson, 
1984) would experience less terrorism than more autocratic societies. Yet, scholars have 
consistently found that democracies encounter more acts of terrorism than authoritarian 
states (Gurr, 1979; Turk, 1982; Chenoweth, 2010). Young and Dugan (2011) provide one 
possible explanation for this, suggesting that despite the greater political freedom fostered 
by a democratic state, the greater the potential for political stalemates, which could lead 
to acts of violence. As such, in seeking to minimize the rational basis for acts of 
terrorism, the literature suggests that a state’s duty to its people extends beyond 
acknowledging the multiple voices of its people, and extends to acting upon these views. 
Importantly, rather than purely being a function of the ability of a state to fulfill this duty, 
it is the populace’s perception of the disaster response that matters in this interaction 
(Drury, Novellie, and Stott, 2013). As such, a state’s actions along with its populace’s 
perception of these actions, more than its structure, reduces incentives for acts of 
terrorism. 
As the range of governance structures and priorities varies immensely across the 
globe (Polity IV, 2013), this duty of a state to its populace also varies. In the case of 
Turkey, this duty is publicly affirmed and is encompassed by the notion of devlet baba. 
Under the Turkish model of devlet baba, loosely translated as ‘the father state’, political 
structures dominate all else to ensure these priorities are upheld (Kubicek, 2002). In a 
recent interview, the president of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, affirmed this responsibility 
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where he stated that the ultimate objective for Turkey was to have its own standards 
raised to the highest possible point through the protection of human rights and the 
interests of Turkey’s people (Tepperman, 2013:7). Further, when questioned whether 
Turkey valued pursuing the ambition of state growth, Gül reiterated that Turkey 
explicitly aims to be a virtuous power; ‘where [Turkey’s] priority lies with safeguarding 
the human rights and interests of all human beings in a manner that also entails the 
provision of aid to those in need without expecting anything in return’ (Tepperman, 
2013:7). Kubicek (2002) argues that despite this rhetoric, historically state authority has 
been prioritized over citizen empowerment and participation, and others have observed 
that democratic functioning has been quite restricted in the past (Özbudun, 2000; 
Abramowitz, 2000). This nexus between Turkey’s rhetoric and perceived relationship 
with its people, and the justification of terrorism will be further discussed in relation to 
the Kurdish population that inhabits much of Turkey. 
2.1 Turkey 
Terrorism cannot be divorced from its political, social, and historical context. The 
unique history of the groups must be integrated into any analysis that seeks to investigate 
the perpetration of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). While certain patterns of terrorism are 
observable globally using nations as the unit of analysis (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2012), these analyses have been unable to measure sub-national 
variation within individual states. As both terrorism and hostility between a government 
and segments of a populace vary geographically and temporally within a nation (Levi, 
Juliano, and Richardson, 2007; Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007), to allow the identification 
of how natural disasters and government responses act as precursors to terrorism, the 
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current analysis measures monthly changes in Turkey over 24 years (June 1987 – 
December 2011, with the exception of 1993). As the presence of an existing grievance 
with the state in addition to geographic isolation has been presented as being relevant to 
the relationship between the perceived adequacy of a government’s response to a natural 
disaster and subsequent acts of terrorism, the following section documents these 
characteristics within Turkey. 
Turkey is and historically has been a bridge between Europe, Asia, the Middle 
East, and the Caucasus (Tepperman, 2013). Conflict in this region dates back millennia 
due to its strategic geographic importance (Köker, 1995). From its historical roots as part 
of the Ottoman Empire, the independence of this nation in 1923 brought about a rapid 
secularization of citizenship and the emergence of strong notions of Turkish nationalism 
(Dokupil, 2002; Natali, 2005). Marked by rapidly growing refugee populations, political 
uncertainty, and a devastated economy in the wake of World War I, a number of stark 
changes to Turkey’s social structure occurred during this period (Zürcher, 1991). 
Turbulent social and cultural changes also occurred for the Kurdish people who inhabit 
this region, as they were predominantly divided amongst four emerging nations (Natali, 
2005). Comprising 20% of Turkey’s population and inhabiting nearly a third of the 
country’s geographical area and agricultural lands, according to Şimşir (1973) the support 
of the predominantly Islamic Kurdish people was vital to the political and initial viability 
of a Turkish state. To help cement this necessary strategic relationship to this emerging 
Turkish government, the leader of the Turkish independence movement, Mustafa Kemal, 
proposed forming a Turkish-Kurdish sisterhood and a federation of Kurdish states in 
return for Kurdish support (Natali, 2005).  
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 Despite these initial promises to the Kurdish people and the political maneuvering 
used to support the formation of a Turkish state, Kemal, under the new name Atatürk 
(Father Turk), subsequently moved to disconnect Islamic culture from Turkey’s identity 
in his new role as Turkey’s first president (Dokupil, 2002). According to Natali (2005) 
the grievances between the Kurdish people and the Turkish government began at this 
nascent point, and were exacerbated through policy enforced cultural changes were that 
incorporated at all levels of Turkish society during this period of ‘Turkification’ which 
prioritized secularism within the emergent Turkish culture. Observed in the appearance of 
Pan-Turkish symbols on money, stamps, university paraphernalia, and the prohibition of 
the word “Kurd”, the Kurdish people were culturally marginalized (Dokupil, 2002; 
Natali, 2005). ‘Turkification’ can also be seen to have culminated in the 1938 Law of 
Associations, which prohibited the formation of societies based on religion, family, 
community, or class and the participation in religious activities by political parties 
(Dokupil, 2002; Kus and Özel, 2010). 
 Based upon these structural changes, it can be seen that the incentives for Kurdish 
support of the Turkish state were eroded by these enacted policies, changes to political 
rhetoric, and the denial of a legitimate social identity. Further, Natali (2005) posits that 
the impacts of these hostile policies extended to Kurdish social structures, changing the 
very nature of the Kurdish identity. The majority of Kurdish people trace their origin to 
the Median Empire in the 6th century B.C.E., as a complex and multifaceted collection of 
tribal communities (Natali: 2005). During the period following Turkey’s federation 
however, external pressure from the Turkish state ethnicized the Kurdish collective 
identity (Kurdayetî) leading to the national divergence of the Kurdish identity between 
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countries, and its homogenous portrayal within Turkey’s political sphere (Natali: 2005). 
Thus, although Kurdish people live throughout a number of nations within the region 
(Figure 1), both their cultural identity and their relationship to the state vary markedly 
between nations. The ethnicization of the Kurdish people has been attributed within the 
extant literature to the negative incentives offered by the central government and the 
actions and reactions of Kurdish groups to these prohibitive incentive structures and 
cultural insecurity (Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci, 1999; Dokupil, 2002; Natali, 2005). 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Kurdish People in Turkey 
 
 Even in the contemporary context, Gunter (2000) has argued that the Kurdish 
demand for cultural, political, and linguistic rights has been seen as a threat to Turkish 
sovereignty. From this perspective, as it existed in Atatürk’s rhetoric, the mere existence 
of Kurdayetî was portrayed as directly opposing the unity of the secularized Turkish 
nation. Borrowing the framework of insecurity from Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 
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(1999), this rhetoric created a political space where any gains in physical and cultural 
security for the Kurdish people could only come at the cost of the physical and cultural 
identity of the unified Turkish state. From the Turkish State’s perspective, this cultural 
dimension of policy was intended to create ‘a new Turk obedient to and in service of the 
new state and allegedly equal to [one another]’ (Köker, 1995; Gunter, 2000). Within 
Atatürk’s rhetoric, this process of ‘Turkification’ aimed to improve the lives of the entire 
population as per the notion of devlet baba if taken at face value. This policy situation 
however necessarily required physical and cultural insecurity for any individual not 
adhering to the new regime, and for the Kurdish people it minimally ensured cultural 
insecurity for those who were willing to abandon their existing cultural capital.  
2.2 After Atatürk 
While similar political stances towards the Kurdish people can still be evidenced 
today (Criss, 1995; Gunter, 2000), it is important to note that subsequent governments 
have varied in their policy stances on these cultural issues. Indeed as illustrated in Figure 
2, since the end of Atatürk’s and Republican People’s Party (RPP) authoritarian rule in 
1946, Turkey has experienced a wide variety in government stances, which is particularly 
evident with regard to shifts policy and perspective related to the Kurdish population. 
Under Democratic Party (DP) governance in the 1950s, the Turkish people experienced a 
discernible increase in national literacy rates and the number of industry workers. In 
addition, this period witnessed the birth of the union movement in Turkey. All of these 
trends challenged the preceding authoritarian notions of guardianship and devlet baba 




Figure 2: Levels of Autocratic and Democratic Authority in Turkey (Polity IV, 
2013) 
A number of legislative changes were introduced during this period that addressed 
some of the Kurdish dissatisfaction with the Turkish government. Marked by a new 
Constitution in 1961, new laws were introduced in Turkey that placed rival political 
parties under constitutional protection, Leftist political groups (with no religious 
affiliations) were granted legal status, and presidential power was limited through a series 
of checks and balances (Harris, 1974). Further, article 19 of the new Turkish Constitution 
guaranteed for the first time freedom of religious faith and worship, and freedom from 
abuse of one’s religion by others (Dokupil, 2002). The cumulative effects of these policy 
reforms directly improved the existing conditions for the Kurdish people (Natali, 2005). 
However, despite these policy changes and the improving physical conditions for the 
people of Turkey including the Kurdish people, no official changes were made to the 


































































































economic development resulting from the politicized use of legislative and permitted 
bureaucratic power further increased the disparity between the Kurdish regions and the 
rest of Turkey (Köker, 1995; Natali, 2005). This growing divide in quality of life between 
non-Kurdish Turks and the Kurdish people have increased the rational justification for 
finding methods to undermine the existing structures in order to bridge this gap.  
Since the politically turbulent 1970s, the social and political climate for the 
Kurdish people has further improved, especially since the country's leaders began 
pushing for admittance into the European Union, which requires adherence to 
democratization goals (Wuthrich, Ardag, and Ugur, 2012). Current laws allow parents to 
give their children Kurdish names; and some classes that teach the Kurdish language are 
now permitted (O’Neil, 2007). However, despite these limited legislative concessions, 
which reduced some of the cultural insecurity for the Kurdish people, many existing 
causes for conflict still persist. For example, armed paramilitary forces supported by the 
Government are still stationed in these predominantly Kurdish areas despite their dubious 
legal status (Natali, 2005; Uslu, 2009; MAR, 2013). These paramilitary groups have been 
linked to the killing of at least 18 Kurdish civilians between 2004 and 2006 (Human 
Rights Watch, 2006 in MAR, 2013). While numerous other violations of human rights 
can be observed in Turkey, it is evident that the Turkish government continues to treat 
Kurdish people as second-class citizens (Criss, 1995; Natali, 2005). 
Terrorism exists as just one of a plethora of options for rationally responding to 
marginalization, and the Kurdish people have made numerous attempts to influence the 
governance of Turkey through other, legitimate means. Despite laws such as the 1938 
Law of Associations that prohibits the formation of societies and political parties based 
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on family, community, religious or class interests, the Kurdish people have attempted to 
influence the legislative process (Dokupil, 2002; Kus and Özel, 2010). In 1990, 10 pro-
Kurdish individuals who had previously represented the Social Democrats founded the 
Halkin Emek Partisi (HEP), otherwise known as the People’s Labor Party (Kogacioglu, 
2004). Echoing the framework that Turkish legislation and rhetoric had previously 
established, charges were leveled against this party regarding its allegedly separatist 
nature in 1993. The Turkish Constitutional Court subsequently dissolved this political 
party due to its alleged separatist agenda (Casier, 2010). The founders of the HEP were 
also involved in the creation of the Democratic Party (DEP), which was barred from 
political participation in 1994, and the succeeding People's Democracy Party (HADEP), 
was also disbanded by the government in 2003 (Casier, 2010). In none of these cases was 
the political party officially Kurdish. Rather the case against these parties rested on their 
members attending Kurdish rallies or repeating Kurdish slogans in sessions of Parliament 
(Kogacioglu, 2004);  
A rather arbitrary boundary between the political and cultural domains 
informs these decisions. The Court operates with the understanding that 
once this boundary is transgressed, what may be harmless when an issue 
is cultural—such as the use of the headscarf or of the Kurdish language—
may turn into a political symbol threatening the basis of the united, 
democratic, and progressive nation-state (Kogacioglu, 2004:433). 
The above quote represents a legal interpretation of the findings from the Turkish 
Constitutional Court, and it is evident that many of the themes that began as symbolic 
laws associated with Atatürk’s secularist push are maintained through these legal and 
legislative structures. A further two political parties DEHAP (2003-05) and DTP (2005-
09) with ties to the Kurdish people have since been disbanded by the court for similar 
reasons relating to an ‘organic’ connection to the terrorist organization, the Kurdistan 
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Workers Party (PKK)  (Casier, 2010; Topal, 2011). The current incarnation of this series 
of political parties with Kurdish ties, Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP), was still 
officially recognized at the time that this thesis was written despite numerous arrests of 
party officials (Casier, Jongerden, and Walker, 2011).  
This succession of attempts to represent the Kurdish people in the official political 
realm existed as alternate means for responding to the coercion exerted by the Turkish 
Government. By thwarting these attempts to gain legitimacy through the political process 
the Turkish Government further substantiated the second-class status of Kurdish people. 
The legal dismissal of these parties confirms the cultural insecurity experienced by 
Kurdish people in the public realm. Although the official relationship between each of 
these parties and the Kurdish people has not been straightforward (Casier, 2010), each of 
the times that one of these parties was disbanded exhausted another legitimate method for 
resolving the conflict between the Kurdish people and the Turkish Government. 
2.3 Terrorism in Turkey 
The conflict between the Turkish Government and the Leftist terrorist organization 
Partiya Karekeren Kurdistan (PKK) has been described as Turkey’s largest current 
problem (Roduplu, Arnold, and Ersoy, 2003; Economist, 2013). This conflict has been 
linked to the reasons behind why Turkey’s democratic processes have not advanced in 
the previous decades, the internal justification of Turkey’s bad human rights record, the 
strong influence that the Turkish Army has had over political life, and economic strain of 
the entire nation (Köker, 1995; Dokupil, 2002; Natali, 2005; Economist, 2013). Further, 
the majority of the estimated 30,000 to 35,000 terrorism-related deaths between 1984 and 
2000 have been attributed to this conflict (Roduplu, Arnold, and Ersoy, 2003). The PKK 
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grew out of the previously described political upheaval of the 1960s and 70s in Turkey, 
and has been closely linked to the plight of the Kurdish people (Roduplu, Arnold, and 
Ersoy, 2003). While the literal translation of PKK, Kurdistan Worker’s Party, implies that 
it is part of the Kurdish Separatist movement in Turkey (Roduplu, Arnold, and Ersoy, 
2003; Çandar, 2012), it was instead founded in 1974 by Öcalan as a Marxist-Leninist 
separatist organization (Criss, 1995); 
Thus, the story of the PKK dates back to the early 1970s. It emerged not in 
the guerrilla camps on the rugged terrain of Southeast Turkey, and not in 
any other neighbouring country in the Middle East but in Turkey’s capital 
city one day in 1974. In other words, as far as its original roots are 
concerned, the PKK came to being not in the Kurdish-populated eastern 
parts of the country but in Central Turkey. It has, however, always been 
dominated by Öcalan (Imset, 1992:9 in Özcan, 2006:79). 
The complex political landscape in Turkey coupled with the physical and cultural 
insecurity in this period fostered the unusual alliance between the movement for Kurdish 
cultural rights and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideologies (Natali, 2005). Despite their 
varying motivations and histories, Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci (1999) conclude that 
collaboration with groups such as the PKK is one of only four viable options that the 
Kurdish people have to address the physical and cultural insecurity that they faced. Other 
than collaboration with the PKK or similar groups, Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 
(1999:995) identify that the Kurdish people could “resign themselves to the status quo 
and continue to live as they have before”, immigrate elsewhere, or choose to collaborate 
directly with the Turkish government. While these options are not mutually exclusive and 
individual Kurds may choose their own paths, any of the three other options would entail 
physical and cultural insecurity for those who continue to express their Kurdayetî and 
each individual who chose to deny it.  
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Similar motivations were also been behind the PKK’s alliance with the Kurdish 
people. Criss (1995) proposes that the PKK gained advantage through its post-hoc 
alliance with the Kurdish people, as it became obvious that the Marxist-Leninist (atheist) 
PKK was unable to draw the mass support it needed from a society with strong religious 
traditions. As such, while the PKK and Kurdish people’s goals were not be directly 
aligned, external coercion in the form of lack of public support for the PKK and 
Government suppression for the Kurdish people provided the rational justification for a 
partnership between these two groups. Öcalan, the founder of the PKK, has also 
explicitly stated that it was only through forces of external coercion that the PKK came to 
be allied with the Kurdish cause; 
I did not emphasize Kurdayetî along with the other leftists during the 
1960s and 70s because the extreme left was very strong and Kurds lost 
their confidence. Also, there was not a dictatorship in Turkey during this 
time. We created the PKK in 1978 at the time of the massacres in 
Karamaraş. Still it was not a party uniquely for the Kurds or for 
Kurdayetî. It was an idea of the socialists… Our revolution was 
socialism… (Perinçek, 1989:16-33 in Natali, 2005:112). 
2.4 Natural Disasters, Government Responses, and Kurdish Terrorism 
This earthquake is a declaration of bankruptcy for the Turkish political 
administrative structure. The Turkish political and administrative systems 
must be investigated from the ground up (Erkan Mumcu, Turkish Tourism 
Minister, 1999 in Green and Ward, 2004). 
Natural disasters are an exogenous shock that also presents a form of external 
coercion that causes physical insecurity for a population (Flynn, 2008). Unrelated to the 
political and social landscape, natural disasters have the ability to rupture the fabric of 
even the most productive and orderly human environments (Hewitt, 1983). Scholars 
argue that natural disasters exacerbate existing tensions between a state and its populace 
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(Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011), and they reveal the lack of preparedness of a state for 
dealing with crises (Waugh, 2006). Conversely, if responded to adequately, a properly 
coordinated disaster management and relief effort can result in positive social outcomes 
which can be evidenced by the altruistic actions of the impacted community and the state 
(Perry and Lindell, 2003). Kanisaty and Norris (2004) have dubbed this process ‘the 
heroic stage’, observing that the social support mobilized through this process often 
occurs in spite of ‘previous community conflicts and race, ethnic, and social class 
barriers’. Connected to the idea that the cause of the disorder is immediately identifiable 
and is unattributed to human action, the need for an immediate response to this external 
stressor mobilizes those impacted, creating a post-disaster utopia (Hall and Landreth, 
1975; Kaniasty and Norris, 2004). This altruistic social reaction is often short lived 
especially in cases with ineffective state support. 
Typically, victimized communities soon discover that the need for 
assistance far exceeds the availability of resources. The initial generosity 
and togetherness are slowly overtaken by a gradual disillusionment and 
the harsh reality of grief, loss, and destruction (Kaniasty and Norris, 
2004:201) 
Given that the state’s response to a natural disaster can make it either the hero or 
the villain to those impacted, and that this status can vary from one disaster to another, it 
does not necessarily follow that the vulnerabilities that are presented by a natural disaster 
provide ideal terrorist targets. Indeed, Berrebi and Ostwald (2011) in their discussion note 
that an immediate terrorist attack following a natural disaster may instill resentment 
among those who have previously been part of the terrorist group’s constituency. While 
this was unaccounted for in their empirical model, this assertion is consistent with the 
rational choice framework described in this thesis. If the state’s response has been 
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deemed to be inadequate however, and as the full impact of the destruction is realized, 
existing tensions between a state and its populace will be exacerbated. 
This thesis holds that the perception of the government’s response, rather than the 
actual government response itself, bears weight on the subsequent decision to engage or 
not to engage in a terrorist action. The disparity between the perception of a government 
response and the actual government response is particularly evident in the 1999 
earthquake that occurred in Marmara, Turkey. In the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS) report on disaster management (2002) cited in the introduction, the swift response 
in restoring power after this 7.4 magnitude earthquake was lauded, and extolled as an 
example of the importance of having planned alternatives to reduce the downtime of 
critical systems and expedite response and recovery. Despite the apparent high level of 
preparation inherent in Turkey’s infrastructure, Kubicek (2002) laments that these 
positive responses did not ease the underlying political unrest in the nation: 
… many hoped that the 1999 earthquakes would lead to an invigoration of 
civil society and subsequent political liberalization. Examining this claim 
shows that Turkish civil society has not been able to sustain the energy it 
enjoyed immediately after the earthquake because of factors within civil 
society itself and the attitude of the state (Kubicek, 2002:761). 
Regardless of the practical response to the Marmara earthquake, the perception 
that the response did not unify the existing political tensions was publicly observed to be 
a great disappointment in this instance. Further, in light of previous dissatisfaction with 
the government, the impacts of the earthquake itself were in many instances equated to 
the inability of the Turkish Government (Geitner, 1999). Although bounded by the 
precarious nature of the rescue attempts, the mounting death toll and the continued spread 
of damage were in many cases attributed to government actions (Akinci, 1999; Geitner, 
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1999). Earlier policy decisions for example were publicly presented as the reason for the 
magnitude of the damage rather than the magnitude of the earthquake (Akinci, 1999), and 
this directed the public focus away from the successful rescue efforts and preparations 
cited by the NAS. Consequently, while an adequate practical response is required for 
positive and cohesive social outcomes following a natural disaster, it is instead the 
perceived adequacy of this response by a populace that exacerbates existing grievances 
and influences the subsequent decision to engage or not to engage in a terrorist action. 
 While the Marmara earthquake occurred in northwest Turkey, its impact was felt 
to various degrees throughout the rest of the nation and especially by the Kurdish people 
who predominately inhabit the southeast (Figure 1). In an interview conducted a week 
after the earthquake, then Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit announced that he was no longer 
able to sustain his support for large investments to combat poverty and unemployment in 
the predominantly Kurdish southeast due to the costs associated with the disaster 
response (Kinzer, 1999). In addition to the redistribution of public funding away from the 
southeast, Huseyin Umit, mayor of Hakari and a leader of the pro-Kurdish People’s 
Democracy Party, expressed Kurdish frustrations with this response in comparison to 
previous treatment that the state had provided to the Kurdish people: 
We have been through a similar situation… We had our own 'earthquake' 
when our villages were evacuated, and we became very poor during the 
fighting between Turkish troops and Kurdish rebels. Nobody has given us 
any help or compensation, but we want to be mature and patient. Although 
promises have been made to us, we cannot expect that they will be kept 
until these difficult days are over (Kinzer, 1999). 
This perceived grievance against the inequitable government support can be seen 
on its own to further incentivize reactions against the state from the Kurdish people. 
Beyond this however, Green and Ward (2004) posit that this earthquake exposed 
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systematic corruption and wide-scale human rights violations that exacerbated the 
negative impact of the earthquake. Far from the high level of preparedness described by 
the NAS (2002) it has even been argued that Turkey’s negligent preparation should be 
seen as a series of criminal acts (Green, 2005). As part of the privatization that began in 
the 1950s and rapidly expanded in the 1980s, hundreds of construction and housing laws 
were repealed and developers were discouraged from following those that remained 
(Kubicek, 2002, Green and Ward, 2004). Indeed, there were at least 12 periods of 
construction amnesty that occurred between 1948 and 2001 despite the opposition of the 
Turkish Chamber of Architects and Engineers (Green and Ward, 2004). Through these 
policy actions that led to sub-standard construction, the government was seen to have 
failed in its duty to protect the people and was connected to exacerbating the damage 
from the earthquakes (Kubicek, 2002). In light of this exacerbated harm and the violation 
of devlet baba, the Turkish state in this period was not only a softer target (Berrebi and 
Ostwald, 2011), but also a morally justifiable target for retribution via legitimate and 
illegitimate means.  
While the immediate aftermath of the natural disaster often leads to altruistic and 
‘heroic’ behavior (Kaniasty and Norris, 2004), if the state is perceived to handle its 
responsibility inadequately, the incentives for terrorism and other criminal acts against 
the state increase following this initial period (Waugh, 2006). Especially in light of the 
previously discussed systematic and arguably criminal practices that undermined the 
housing industry in Turkey and explicit coercion that enabled this system of corruption 
(Kubicek, 2002; Green and Ward, 2004; Green, 2005), the preexisting motives for 
terrorism were exacerbated. Further, given the clearly defined and unifying nature of the 
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natural disaster, it is plausible that these stressors provide the impetus for the commission 
of act of terrorism. Consequently, as communities are united by the impact of a natural 
disaster and polarized through the subsequent response by the state, a natural disaster 
may provide the catalyst for the temporal and geographic variation in terrorist actions.  
2.5 Hypotheses 
 
Stemming from the above theoretical argument and political history regarding 
Turkey, natural disasters, and terrorism, this thesis poses four major hypotheses. The first 
is principally concerned with identifying whether the link between natural disasters and 
terrorism is direct, and to observe whether any relationship fluctuates over time. 
Continuing the line of research into the relationship between natural disasters and 
terrorism, this thesis specifically seeks to evaluate whether the perceived adequacy of a 
government’s response has an impact on the relationship between natural disasters and 
subsequent ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism within a nation. Although Berrebi and 
Ostwald (2011) observed variation in the effects of a natural disaster and subsequent 
terrorism across types of disaster, it is unclear what processes were driving this variation.  
From the perspective advanced by this thesis, when a government’s response to a 
natural disaster is perceived as adequate it should reduce the number of subsequent 
terrorist attacks. This hypothesis if true, would identify that the government has a unique 
opportunity to respond to natural disasters in ways that alter the underlying motivations 




H1. The perceived adequacy of the government’s response to a natural 
disaster is inversely related to the number of subsequent terrorist attacks 
within Turkey. 
Given the importance of a state’s ability to prepare for and react to a natural 
disaster in order to minimize both short and long-term negative consequences within the 
literature (Kaniasty and Norris, 2004; Galea, Nandi, and Vlahov, 2005; Waugh, 2006), 
the rival hypothesis presented here allows for a natural disaster to be a catalyst for 
improved relations between a state and its constituency or to aggravate relations leading 
to more terrorism (Hall and Landreth, 1975; Perry and Lindell, 2003; Kaniasty and 
Norris, 2004).  
Beyond investigating the link between how a natural disaster is responded to by a 
state and subsequent terrorism, the previous discussion argues that not all terrorist 
organizations respond in the same manner to these events. Particularly when an 
organization supports a geographically and ethnically isolated constituency that is 
economically dependent on a central government, as is the case with the Kurdish people 
in Turkey, they will be more responsive to the adequacy of the government’s response. 
As such, this thesis postulates that the link between the handling of a natural disaster and 
subsequent terrorism will also be evident when looking solely at Kurdish terrorist attacks 
within Turkey. Conversely, when a constituency is not isolated in the aforementioned 
manners, as is the case for Islamists and Leftists in Turkey, this thesis further argues that 
the impact of a government’s response to a disaster will not have an appreciable effect on 
subsequent terrorism committed by organizations with links to these groups. As such, this 
thesis thus explicitly tests the following hypotheses: 
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H2. a) The perceived adequacy of the government’s response to a natural 
disaster is inversely related to the number of subsequent Kurdish 
terrorist attacks within Turkey. 
b) Regardless of the adequacy of the government response, natural 
disasters are unrelated to subsequent acts of non-Kurdish terrorism. 
Additionally, this thesis seeks to test whether any impact that a natural disaster 
has on subsequent terrorism is consistent across a specific state. Given the policy 
importance of both human-made and natural disaster management (Waugh, 2006), it is 
vital to observe whether these two broad phenomena are indeed related at a unit of 
analysis more fine-grained than the nation-state. As it has been argued above, Turkey is a 
nation plagued by both large-scale natural disasters and terrorism that occur in both the 
predominantly Kurdish southeast and outside of this region, and is therefore an apt 
subject for this hypothesis. In light of the aforementioned historical dimensions and the 
connection between religion, culture, and terrorism in Turkey, it is reasonable that for the 
marginalized Kurdish populations within Turkey that an inadequate response to a natural 
disaster has an appreciable impact on the rational justification for subsequent terrorism. 
However, this thesis also recognizes that even a poor response to a natural disaster in 
many cases will be insufficient to reach the threshold needed to rationally justify 
terrorism as a response to non-marginalized constituencies. Focusing on the Kurdish 
southeast of Turkey, this thesis posits that a state’s response to a natural disaster will only 
be relevant to terrorist organizations whose constituencies are impacted by the response 
to the disaster. Thus, while a ‘target softening’ based hypothesis would maintain that 
natural disasters would lead to more subsequent terrorism regardless of location, this 
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thesis does not expect to observe an increase in non-Kurdish terrorism in the wake of a 
natural disaster in the southeast of Turkey. To empirically test whether the relationship 
between natural disasters and terrorism is determined by the geographic nature of the 
organization’s constituency, this thesis tests the following hypotheses: 
H3. a) The perceived adequacy of the government’s response to a natural 
disaster that occurred in the southeast is inversely related to the number 
of subsequent Kurdish terrorist attacks within Turkey. 
b) Natural disasters that occur in the Kurdish southeast are unrelated to 
subsequent acts of non-Kurdish terrorism regardless of the adequacy of 
the government response. 
In order to gauge the indirect effects that a natural disaster has upon have upon 
various regions within a nation, this thesis also explores whether natural disasters that 
occur outside of the southeast also affects Kurdish terrorism. Drawing upon Kinzer’s 
(1999) assertion that the impacts of natural disasters that occurred in the rest of Turkey 
were felt in the southeast through the removal of resources from this area, an adequate 
response elsewhere can also lead to an increase in subsequent Kurdish terrorism. Given 
that the remainder of Turkey’s terrorist constituencies are not geographically 
concentrated nor isolated as is the case with the Kurdish people, this thesis further 
expects that natural disasters that occurred outside of southeastern Turkey are unrelated 
to subsequent acts of non-Kurdish terrorism regardless of the adequacy of the 
government response. This can be seen as an extension of the above argument that these 
groups have not been marginalized sufficiently in order for a natural disaster and its 
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response to reach the threshold needed to rationally justify terrorism as a response to non-
marginalized constituencies. Thus, this thesis tests the following hypotheses: 
H4. a) The government’s response to a natural disaster that occurred outside 
of southeastern Turkey is positively related to the number of subsequent 
Kurdish terrorist attacks. 
b) Natural disasters that occur outside of southeastern Turkey is 
unrelated to subsequent acts of non-Kurdish terrorism regardless of the 




To test the above hypotheses, data were compiled from a number of different 
sources to measure terrorism, natural disasters, the adequacy of the Turkish 
Government’s response to natural disasters, and to provide controls for the relationship 
between these key phenomena. The following section describes how data were collected 
for this thesis and how these key phenomena were operationalized. In order to observe 
how the impacts of a natural disaster vary over time, this thesis combined all of the data 
collected into a time-series dataset with the month as the unit of analysis. As one of the 
primary criticisms of the previous approach to investigating the link between natural 
disasters and terrorism (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011) was that it was only able to observe 
yearly variation, the present method offers a methodological advance for this line of 
research. This thesis will evaluate whether the trend observed by Berrebi and Ostwald 
(2011) was an artifact of their data that masked underlying variation within the 
motivations of terrorist organizations. As the previous analysis regarding the relationship 
between natural disasters and terrorism was limited to yearly data, the time between 
subsequent years were treated as equivalent even though it could vary between one 
month and 24 months.1 Further, when there are multiple incidents within a year, this 
variation is then essentially aggregated for the analysis. As such, one of the primary goals 
of this thesis is to evaluate whether it is indeed appropriate to explore this relationship 
using yearly-level data. Particularly as the lag time is currently unknown between the 
date of a natural disaster and subsequent terrorism, this level of granularity can help to 
1 This temporal interval may only be one month if a natural disaster occurred in December of year t and an 
act of terrorism occurred at year t+1. Further if a natural disaster occurred in January of year t, and an act of 
terrorism occurred in December of year t+1, this would be treated as being equivalent within this format. 
Indeed, in this latter case there may be have been a natural disaster that occurred in the same year that is 
more temporally proximal, that would not be statistically connected using this model. 
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infer whether it is appropriate to investigate this relationship using yearly-level data in 
future research on this topic. 
While a given natural disaster has the ability to impact an entire nation, even 
within heavily affected areas individual responses vary markedly (Galea, Nandi, and 
Vlahov, 2005). Further, it has been previously argued that geographically marginalized 
populations such as the Kurdish people in Turkey respond to natural disasters differently 
from the rest of the population, and that the response depends on the location of the 
natural disaster. In order to capture this potential variation at a sub-national level, all 
natural disaster events were also coded as to whether or not they occurred in the 
predominantly Kurdish southeast. While future studies should seek to observe this 
variation at the province-level, the present study provides justification for using a courser 
granularity of geography. To investigate the relationship between natural disasters, the 
government’s response, and subsequent terrorism, data are available for 24 years (June 
1987 – December 2011 with the exception of 1993) resulting in 271 months of data for 
the present study.  
3.1 Terrorism 
In line with numerous previous studies that have examined terrorism (LaFree and 
Ackerman, 2008; LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw, 2009; Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev, 
2011; Young and Dugan, 2011; Chasdi, 2012), the dependent variables for this study 
come from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the number of terrorism events 
experienced each month in Turkey. The GTD is an event-based database that contains 
information on all terrorist events across the globe between 1970 and 2012 (LaFree, 
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Dugan, Fogg, and Scott, 2006; LaFree and Dugan, 2007).2 Data for 1993 were 
unfortunately lost from this dataset by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS), and 
this year has been excluded from the present analysis. It should also be noted that this 
database relies on data collected from public media outlets that report in English. As 
numerous media outlets in Turkey use languages other than English, it is likely that the 
data used for this investigation underestimate the total number of terrorist events that 
occurred in Turkey during the time period being examined (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). 
Within the GTD dataset, terrorism is defined as, “the threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence to attain political, economic, religious, or social goals through 
fear, coercion, or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). Functionally, for an 
incident to have been included in the dataset, it must contain the following three 
elements: 
I. The incident was intentional (the result of a conscious calculation on the 
part of the perpetrator) 
II. The incident included some observable level of violence or the threat of 
violence 
III. The perpetrator of the incident was a sub-national actor. 
In addition to these three criteria, two of the following three conditions must also be met 
in order for an event to have been included in the GTD:  
I. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal  
II. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than 
the immediate victims 
III. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian 
Law (START, 2009). 
2 As the analysis for this study was conducted prior to the most recent release of GTD data, the present 
thesis only includes data until the end of 2011. 
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Although the original collection of GTD data was funded by the US National 
Institute of Justice, and is now funded by the US Department of Homeland Security and 
the US State Department, the separation of the data collection from a government agency 
can be seen as a great strength of this dataset. This separation limits the potential for 
political biases to influence both the data collection procedure and the operational 
definitions. The complete list of the variables and their operationalization can be found at 
the end of this section in Table 1.  
It should also be noted that out of the 2,194 terrorist attacks in Turkey that were 
recorded during this period by the GTD, the perpetrator was recorded as unknown for 
726 (33.1%) of these events. Although it is plausible that individuals associated with the 
Kurdish people committed a proportion of these attacks, this thesis has chosen to treat 
these events as being non-Kurdish attacks in the subsequent analysis. While this should 
be seen as a limitation of this data source and the present study, Kurdish terrorist attacks 
are thus operationally defined as terrorist attacks that are attributed to an organization 
with ties to the Kurdish people. While this has no impact when looking at all terrorism in 
Turkey collectively, based on the theoretical predictions of this study the presence of 
Kurdish attacks that have been recorded as unknown within the GTD could lead to type II 
errors for the relationship between the perceived adequacy of natural disasters on 
subsequent Kurdish terrorism, and Type I errors for the models that specifically observe 
non-Kurdish terrorism. As such, estimations of the impact of the perceived adequacy of 
the response to a natural disaster upon subsequent Kurdish terrorism will likely be 
conservative in nature. 
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3.2 Natural Disaster Data 
In order to assess the potential link between natural disasters and terrorism, data 
on natural disasters have been accessed from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) 
produced by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). These 
data were collected from numerous United Nations agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, insurance companies, research institutes, and press agencies (CRED, 
2010). In cases where the details of a given disaster differ, the data collected from UN 
agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies were given priority (CRED, 2010). Within this database, for an event to be 
classified as a natural disaster it must meet at least one of the following operational 
criteria: 
I. 10 or more people killed 
II. 100 or more people affected 
III. Declaration of a state of emergency 
IV. Call for international assistance (CRED, 2010). 
For this thesis, data were obtained pertaining to natural disasters that occurred in 
Turkey between June 1987 and December 2011, comprising 88 separate natural disasters. 
The data include information on the type of disaster, its start and end date, its location, 
and the number of deaths attributed to it. While the present analysis is concerned with the 
timing and location of natural disasters within Turkey, these other factors are used to 
ascertain whether any observed relationship is conditioned by the magnitude (number of 
deaths, duration, and type) of a given natural disaster. The complete list of the variables 
and their operationalization can be found at the end of this section in Table 1.  
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In order to measure whether the Turkish Government’s response to a given 
natural disaster was seen to be adequate, a systematic search was made of Reuters News 
articles using the search syntax <Turk*> in the Factiva database. This search yielded 
104,909 articles in total for the period between June 1987 and December 2011. The lead 
sentences from each of these articles were then extracted from this pool of articles, and 
were used to ascertain the perceived adequacy of the government’s response. Previous 
research has suggested that the lead sentences from Reuters articles are consistent with 
the narrative that is contained within the full article, and are also able to identify major 
trends in conflict within this geographic region (Schrodt and Gerner, 1994).  From this 
sample, lead sentences were identified that made reference to a natural disaster by 
searching for the words ‘disaster’, ‘earthquake’, ‘flood’, ‘temperature’, ‘epidemic’, 
‘landslide’, or ‘avalanche’ in line with the EM-DAT typology of natural disasters 
(CRED, 2010).3 This search yielded 10,332 lead sentences, which were coded as to 
whether each article presented that the Turkish Government’s response was adequate, 
inadequate, or whether it indicated no opinion.  
As this study only coded the lead sentence of each article and not the entire 
article, in the vast majority of cases a value judgment regarding the adequacy of the 
government’s response was not found directly in the lead sentence. As such, lead 
sentences were coded as adequate if the lead sentence described the response in a positive 
manner or reported a positive outcome, and negative if the lead sentence described the 
3 It was evident from the Reuters articles that were collected other natural events occurred that were 
excluded from the EM-DAT database. For example, forest fires and floods did occur in the southeast 
during the time period being examined, however these events did not reach the thresholds required by the 
EM-DAT database for being classified as a natural disaster. Many of these events happened in uninhabited 
areas and affected less than 100 people however, and it is unlikely that these events would have had the 
same if any impact as the larger events that were included in this dataset and were classified as natural 
disasters. As such, these natural events are excluded from the measures for natural disasters and the 
perceived adequacy of response. 
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response in a negative manner or reported a negative outcome. In cases where both 
positive and negative outcomes were mentioned, these lead sentences were coded as no 
opinion. Positive outcomes included; returning vital resources to an area, successfully 
rescuing individuals, limiting the geographic spread of the damage, and general positive 
statements. Negative outcomes included; failed attempts to rescue individuals, failed 
attempts to restore resources to an area, claims that the government didn’t respond at all, 
allegations of corruption, and general negative statements. While this measure is not 
ideal, if these measures were limited to only direct claims regarding the perceieved 
adequacy specifically then there would not be sufficient variation to conduct any 
worthwhile analysis. While unavailable to the present study, methods that are able to 
capture sub-national variation with regard to the perception of the response to a natural 
disaster be incorporated into the methods employed by future studies would present a 
large improvement over the current methods. For example, interviews or consistent 
polling of the public’s perceptions of these issues would be invaluable for this purpose. It 
should also be noted however that news articles that referred to natural events that did not 
meet the requirements to be classified as a natural disaster according to the above EM-
DAT criteria but were referred to using this terminology were excluded. The following 
lead sentences represent examples of each category: 
I. Adequate - Workers rescued an 11-year-old boy from the ruins of an 
apartment block in southern Turkey on Sunday, a day after he was trapped 
in an earthquake (6/28/98) 
 
II. Inadequate - Frustrated Turks accused the government and military of not 
doing enough to rescue victims of an earthquake that killed nearly 3,500 
people and injured more than 16,000. Survivors said the authorities had 
failed to send any professional rescuers to areas outside Istanbul and Izmit, 
the two main cities devastated by Tuesday's quake. Thousands were 




III. No Opinion - An earthquake measuring 5.3 on the Richter scale hit 
Turkey's western province of Izmir on Thursday, state-run Anatolian news 
agency said. (7/9/98) 
 
 
As the government response to numerous natural disasters during this period was 
only reported in either a positive or negative fashion in many cases, a ratio could not be 
constructed for this measure. Instead, the adequacy of the Turkish Government’s 
response was calculated as a count of the number of articles that present a favorable 
opinion of the government’s response minus the number of articles that present an 
unfavorable opinion of the government’s response to the disaster.4 As such, it should be 
noted that the magnitude of these scores is subject to any bias inherent to the media 
attention that was paid to each respective natural disaster by Reuters during this period. 
While subsequent research is required in order to evaluate how accurately Reuters News 
reflects the attitudes and perspective of the Turkish public, the inclusion of an element in 
this measure that is able to account for the volume of articles regarding the government 
response helps to capture the prominence of this issue within the public’s attention 
(Adams, 1986). Between June 1987 and December 2011, 252 Reuters News articles 
made reference to the adequacy of the Turkish Government’s response to a natural 
disaster and were individually coded to calculate the perceived adequacy of the 
government’s response. Although this presents a large exclusion rate from the original 
10,332 sentences that produced by the aforementioned search, in the vast majority of 
cases language pertaining to natural disasters was used for its metaphorical value within 




                                                 
these lead sentences (I), referred to international events that involved Turkey (II), or were 
referring to non-natural disasters (III). 
I. The Turkish central bank absorbed 11.8 trillion lira at 50 percent, 
after the money market was flooded by 36 trillion lira from 
maturing T-bills (5/3/1995). 
II. More than 1,450 people were killed and 4,400 injured on Tuesday 
when Japan's worst earthquake in nearly half a century caused 
massive damage and touched off many fires in and around the 
southern port of Kobe…  March 1970, Gebiz, Turkey: More than 
1,100 killed. (1/17/1995) 
III. Turkey's new incursion into Iraq spotlights the shortcomings of its 
big push in March and could spell disaster for plans to secure the 
border with the help of Iraqi Kurds, diplomats and Iraqi Kurds said 
on Friday (7/7/1995). 
In line with the above hypotheses concerning whether there is any 
geographic variation within the relationship between the perceived adequacy of 
the government’s response to a natural disaster and subsequent terrorism, some of 
the following models will include separate measures for the perceived adequacy 
for natural disasters that occurred in the Southeast and for those that occurred 
outside of the southeast. A complete list of all of the variables is included at the 




In order to better compare the findings generated by this thesis with the existing 
study conducted by Berrebi and Ostwald (2011), the control variables used for the 
following analysis were constructed in a parallel manner to the previous scheme. Further 
the control variables that were selected are in line with the extant literature regarding the 
social, political, and economic contexts that influence terrorism activity and disaster 
effects (Berrebi and Lackdawalla, 2007).  
All data for the following variables were sourced from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database (2013) in order to control for elements of demographic 
and economic yearly variation during this period for all of Turkey. The specific controls 
that were incorporated for the forthcoming analysis are: percentage of working 
population unemployed, gross domestic product per capita in constant 2000 US Dollars, 
gross consumption expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GFCE), 
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, and Development Assistance 
Committee country inflows as a percentage of GDP (DAC). The complete list of the 
variables and their operationalization can be found at the end of this section in Table 1. 
Both population and urbanization are included as controls as they directly impact the 
magnitude of the consequences of a natural disaster (Kennedy, 2002). Further, GDP per 
capita is also included as a control variable as it has been considered to be an adequate 
proxy for a country’s ability to mitigate the effects of a disaster and other development 
indicators (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011). Government consumption expenditures are also 
used to measure of the size of the government, and have also been used previously as a 
proxy for the degree of “government intrusiveness” into societal affairs (Robison et al. 
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2006; Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011). The level of foreign investment and DAC country 
inflows are used to control for participation in the global economy and forces of 
globalization (Fearon and Laitin, 2012).  
Finally, it should also be noted that these control variables only capture yearly 
variation within Turkey. While this represents the best available data available regarding 
these measures in Turkey from a politically neutral source, any findings specifically 
related to the relationship between these control variables and the outcome should be 
treated with great caution. The standard errors for these estimates will be smaller than 
they would be if monthly variation was observed. Consequently, with smaller standard 
errors significance levels will be exaggerated leading to possible Type I errors. Despite 
this limitation, it is important that these nation-level characteristics be controlled for as 
they represent the major correlates of terrorism globally and their exclusion from the 
following models would potentially bias subsequent estimates as they are also correlated 
with the perceived adequacy of the government’s response to a natural disaster (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2012). 
In order to control for the potential impact of previous responses to natural 
disasters, a variable was also created to measure the cumulative perceived adequacy of 
responses during the previous 12 months. This variable was calculated by summing the 
adequacy scores described above for the twelve previous months. In order to differentiate 
between the varying impact of responses in the southeast of Turkey compared to the rest 
of the nation, this measure was calculated separately for disasters that occurred in each of 
these areas. Further, to account for the magnitude of the grief that was experienced by the 
communities affected by a natural disaster, and to control for the impact of reporting the 
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number causalities alongside opinions of the government response within the lead 
sentences, the number of people killed in a natural disaster is also included in the 
subsequent analysis. Potential multicolinearity between the presence of a natural disaster 
and the number of people killed is assessed. 
3.4 Operationalization 
 Below is a table that provides the operational definitions and sources for all 
variables contained within the subsequent analysis. 
Table 1: List of variables, their operationalization, and the source from which 
they were drawn. 
Variable Operational Definition Source 
Act of Terrorism Frequency of terrorist attacks in a 
month.  
GTD 
Kurdish Act of 
Terrorism 
Frequency of terrorist attacks that were 
attributed to an organization with ties to 
the Kurdish people in a month. 
GTD 
Non-Kurdish Act of 
Terrorism 
Frequency of terrorist attacks that were 
not attributed to an organization with 
ties to the Kurdish people in a month. 
GTD 
Natural Disaster Frequency of natural disasters in a 
month. 
EM-DAT 
Perceived Adequacy The count of the number of articles that 
present a favorable opinion of the 
government’s response minus the 
number of articles that present an 
unfavorable opinion of the 
government’s response to the specific 
disaster. 
Reuters 
Southeast Disaster The count of the number of articles that 
present a favorable opinion of the 
government’s response minus the 
number of articles that present an 
unfavorable opinion of the 
government’s response that occurred in 




Non-Southeast Disaster The count of the number of articles that 





government’s response minus the 
number of articles that present an 
unfavorable opinion of the 
government’s response that occurred 
outside of the southeast in a month. 
Google News 
Killed Frequency of persons confirmed as dead 
and persons missing and presumed dead 
due to a natural disaster in a month. 
EM-DAT 
Southeast adequacy over 
the last twelve months 
The summation of articles that present a 
favorable opinion of the government’s 
response minus the number of articles 
that present an unfavorable opinion of 
the government’s response to specific 
disasters that occurred in the southeast 
over the previous 12 months. 
Reuters 
Non-Southeast adequacy 
over the last twelve 
months 
The summation of articles that present a 
favorable opinion of the government’s 
response minus the number of articles 
that present an unfavorable opinion of 
the government’s response to specific 
disasters that occurred outside of the 
southeast over the previous 12 months. 
Reuters 
Population (Millions) Frequency of all residents of legal 
status, except for refugees not 
permanently settled in country of 
Asylum, measured in millions. 
Turkish 
Statistical 
Institute and The 
World Bank 
Election Year 1 if month in an election year 0 
otherwise 
The World Bank 
Percentage of Working 
Population Unemployed 
Percentage of the labor force that is 
without work but available for and 
seeking employment. 
The World Bank 
Gross Domestic Product 
per capita in constant 
2000 Billion US Dollars 
The sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of 
the products (Billion US Dollars).  
The World Bank 
Gross government final 
consumption 
expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP 
(GFCE)  
Percentage of all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and 
services.  
The World Bank 
Foreign direct 
investment as a 
percentage of GDP 
Percentage of the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that 
The World Bank 
44 
 
of the investor. 
Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) 
country inflows as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Percentage of loans made on 
concessional terms and grants made to 
promote economic development and 
welfare in countries and territories in the 
DAC list of ODA recipients.  






The analysis begins by presenting the trends of terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters within Turkey between 1987 and 2011. Following these temporal and 
geographic descriptions, the perceived adequacy of the Turkish Government’s responses 
to these disasters is also presented. 
In order to test the four hypotheses each model is estimated using an 
Autoregressive Poisson regression. As the dependent variable is a rare event that 
measures the number of terrorist attacks in a given month, Autoregressive Poisson 
regression is selected as it corrects for autocorrelation (Schwarz et al., 1996; 
Katsouyanni, et al., 1996).  
Recall that hypothesis 1 includes one testable hypotheses:   The perceived 
adequacy of the government’s response to a natural disaster is inversely related to the 
number of subsequent terrorist attacks within Turkey.  To test these hypotheses, an 
autoregressive Poisson is run using the following equations: 
(1) Log(Terrorismt+1)=  αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where:  αt= log (β1adequacy + β5𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
 In the above models, αt refers to the logistic distribution function of the relevant 
independent variables at time point t. The subscripts t and t+1 show whether the variable 
was measured, during the current month or following month respectively. The αt ◦ y 
operator represents the autoregressive process. The 𝜀 is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed Poisson with mean λ > 0 and independent of yt+1. Within this 
model, if hypothesis 1a is supported, the coefficient estimate for 𝛽1 will be both positive 
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and statistically significant. If hypothesis 1b is supported, the coefficient estimate for 𝛽1 
will be both negative and statistically significant.  
Recall that hypothesis 2 includes two testable hypotheses:  a) The perceived 
adequacy of the government’s response to a natural disaster is inversely related to the 
number of subsequent Kurdish terrorist attacks within Turkey; and b) Regardless of the 
adequacy of the government response, natural disasters is unrelated to subsequent acts of 
non-Kurdish terrorism.  To test these hypotheses, an autoregressive Poisson is run using 
the following equations: 
 (2a) Log(Kurdish Terrorismt+1)=  αt ◦ yt +𝜀  
where:  αt= log (β1adequacy + β2previous_adequacy + β5𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 +
𝛽6𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
 (2b) Log(Non-Kurdish Terrorismt+1)=  αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where:  αt= log (β1adequacy + β2previous_adequacy + β5𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 +
𝛽6𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)  
If hypothesis 2a is supported, the coefficient estimate for 𝛽1 will be both negative 
and statistically significant. If hypothesis 2b is supported, the coefficient estimate for 𝛽1 
will not be statistically significant.  
The third and fourth hypotheses explored by this thesis are concerned with 
determining whether there is any sub-national geographic variation within in the 
relationship between the adequacy of the response to a natural disaster on subsequent 
terrorism. Recall that hypothesis 3 includes two testable hypotheses:  a)  The perceived 
adequacy of the government’s response to a natural disaster that occurred in the southeast 
is inversely related to the number of subsequent Kurdish terrorist attacks within Turkey; 
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and b) Natural disasters that occur in the Kurdish southeast are unrelated to subsequent 
acts of non-Kurdish terrorism regardless of the adequacy of the government response.  
Further, hypothesis 4 also includes two testable hypotheses:  a) The government’s 
response to a natural disaster that occurred outside of southeastern Turkey is positively 
related to the number of subsequent Kurdish terrorist attacks; and b) Natural disasters that 
occur outside of southeastern Turkey is unrelated to subsequent acts of non-Kurdish 
terrorism regardless of the adequacy of the government response. To avoid potential 
omitted variable bias, hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested simultaneously.  As with the above 
equations (2a and 2b), these hypotheses are also further divided in order to differentiate 
between Kurdish and non-Kurdish terrorism. To test these hypotheses, an autoregressive 
Poisson is run using the following equations: 
 (3a) Log(Kurdish Terrorismt+1)=  αt ◦ yt +𝜀  
where: αt 
=log (β1SEAdequacy + β2NonSEAdequacy + β3SEPreviousAdequacy +
β4NonSEPreviousAdequacy + β5𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  
(3b) Log(Non-Kurdish Terrorismt+1)=  αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where:αt=
log (β1SEAdequacy + β2NonSEAdequacy + β3SEPreviousAdequacy +
β4NonSEPreviousAdequacy + β5𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
If hypothesis 3a is supported, the coefficient estimate for 𝛽1 in equation 3a will be 
both negative and statistically significant. If hypothesis 3b is supported, the coefficient 
estimate for 𝛽1 will not be statistically significant within equation 3b. Further, if 
hypothesis 4a is supported, the coefficient estimate for 𝛽2 in equation 3a will be both 
positive and statistically significant. If hypothesis 4b is supported, the coefficient 
estimate for 𝛽1 in equation 3b will not be statistically significant. 
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This thesis postulates that acts of terrorism that rationally arise due to government 
responses to natural disasters would likely take some time to manifest (Kavanagh, 2006), 
and that this relationship changes over time (Perry and Lindell, 2003). As it is unknown 
what period of time would be appropriate for this response following a natural disaster, 
sensitivity analyses are conducted by estimating the effects using multiple lags. In all 
cases, monthly lags are sequentially tested ranging from 0 to 12 months. Based upon the 
findings of these sensitivity tests (Appendix A), all of the following hypotheses are 




As the terrorism of a nation and the severity and frequency of natural disasters can 
vary immensely, this findings section begins by presenting the descriptive statistics for 
the primary dependent and independent variables that were used in the subsequent 
analyses. 
5.1 Terrorism in Turkey 
According to the GTD, there were 2,187 terrorist attacks that occurred in Turkey 
between June 1987 and December 2011. Of these attacks, 1,076 (49.2%) were attributed 
to organizations affiliated with the Kurdish people. These attacks by Kurdish related 
groups were responsible for the deaths of 3,594 people, comprising 81.8% of all of the 
deaths from terrorism in Turkey (n=4395). The trend of the total terrorist attacks and 
Kurdish Terrorist attacks can be seen below in Figure 3. At least three major peaks in 
terrorism can be observed during this period occurring in 1992, 1994, and 1999, with the 
volume of attacks reducing in magnitude after this final peak. While the monthly 
frequencies of terrorism and Kurdish terrorism follow similar trajectories throughout the 
period being examined, groups without recorded ties to the Kurdish people did commit 
the vast majority of the terrorist attacks during 1991. Kurdish terrorist groups committed 
only 83 (28.3%) of the 293 attacks that occurred in this year. Even in this year however, 





Figure 3: Distribution of Terrorist Attacks in Turkey (1995-2001) 
5.2 Natural Disaster Profile 
Between June 1987 and December 2011, Turkey experienced 88 natural disasters 
that occurred across 77 separate months (Figure 4). During this period, 21,100 people 
were killed by natural disasters in Turkey, with 8 individual natural disasters resulting in 
the deaths of more than 100 people respectively. Out of the 271 months in the present 
sample, one natural disaster was experienced in 65 months, 11 months had two natural 
disasters, and three natural disasters occurred in March 2004. Earthquake was the modal 
disaster type for this period, with 31 occurring in Turkey, followed by floods (f=29). It is 
also evident that the types of natural disasters varied between the southeast of Turkey and 
the rest of the nation, with more than twice as many floods occurring outside of the 
southeast and as all recorded forest fires and landslides that met the EM-DAT criteria for 
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below in Figure 5. A total of 21,097 people were killed by these natural disasters, with 
the vast majority of these (f=17,127) occurring due to the Marmara earthquake that 
occurred in August 1999. According to the data sourced from EM-DAT, an estimated 
6,107,363 people were directly affected, and more than $26.7 billion ($US) damage was 
caused by the natural disasters that occurred during this period. These estimates should be 
viewed however as a lower bound for the impact of natural disasters in Turkey however 
due to problems with estimating populations affected due to temperature fluctuations and 
disease. Out of the 88 natural disasters, 36 occurred in southeast Turkey (40.9%). 
 

















































































































































































































































Figure 5: Types of Natural Disasters that occurred in Turkey 1987-2011 
 Every natural disaster that occurred during the sampling period and met the above 
requirements according to the EM-DAT database5 had at least one Reuters News article 
that made reference to the adequacy of the Turkish Government’s response. Overall, the 
distribution of the adequacy scores ranged between -11 and +5 and can be seen to be 
mound shaped with a slight negative skew and centered around 0 (Figure 6). After 
calculating the adequacy of the government’s response, 37 out of the 88 natural disasters 
(42.0%) were coded as being handled in a positive manner. Nearly half of these however 
had a final adequacy score of +1 however (n=18, 48.7%), with two natural disasters 
having the most positive score that was observed at +5. The remainder of the natural 
disasters were recorded as having negative scores for the government’s response (n=51, 
5 A naturally occurring phenomenon that: killed 10 or more people, affected more than 100 people, 














































                                                 
51.3%). Across all of the disasters, the average adequacy of the government’s response 
was -0.83 and the sum of all of the adequacy scores during this period was -73.  
 
 
Figure 6: Adequacy of Government Response to Natural Disasters 1987-2011 
Despite the three worst adequacy scores being recorded for natural disasters that 
occurred outside of the southeast of Turkey, both regions had nearly numerically 
identical adequacy score means (?̅? =-0.8302 for not-southeast vs. ?̅? =-0.8286 for 
southeast). Offset by also having the two highest adequacy scores (+5), the non-southeast 
also had the majority of articles that commented upon the adequacy of the government’s 
response in the sample (n=158, 62.7%). Twenty out of the 36 natural disasters that 
occurred in the southeast had a calculated adequacy score that was negative (55.6%), 
compared to 31 out of the 52 that occurred outside of this region (59.6%). The full 
distribution of these adequacy scores across the two regions can be seen below in Figure 
7. 










































Figure 7: Adequacy of Government Response to Natural Disasters 1987-2011 by 
Location 
 When these adequacy scores were calculated for each individual month in the 
sample, the monthly scores ranged between -15 and +5. Although there does not appear 
to be any observable trend in the monthly adequacy scores (Figure 8), only four of the 12 
months that had multiple disasters contained adequacy scores that were both positive and 
negative. Thus, for the eight months in the sample the monthly adequacy of the 
government response was found to be greater in magnitude then any of the individual 
responses, accounting for the score of -15 observed in August 1999. Further, for no 
month in the sample did the monthly adequacy score for all of Turkey, or for any region, 
sum to 0 unless no natural disaster was observed for this month. When the adequacy was 
divided by region however (Figure 9), it was evident that the perceived adequacy did 
follow some trends during the observed time period. For example, between July 2000 and 
May 2007 only two out of the 16 natural disasters (12.5%) that occurred in southeast 










































Turkey had a positive perceived adequacy score, and the combined adequacy score was -
32 for this period (?̅? = −2). During the same period however, 10 out of the 19 natural 
disasters (52.6%) that occurred in the non-southeast had a positive perceived adequacy 
score, with a combined adequacy score of -1 (?̅? = −0.053). 
 
Figure 8: Monthly Adequacy of Government Response (1987-2011) 
 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3 Natural Disasters and Subsequent Terrorism 
The first hypothesis posited by this thesis concerned the perceived adequacy of 
the response had upon terrorism in the following month.6 Model 1 in Table 2 revealed 
that the perceived adequacy of a government’s response to a natural disaster was 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the following month 
(IRR=1.074). Although this finding is contrary to the hypothesized relationship, had a 
two-tailed hypothesis been used, it would have been statistically significant. The 
calculated IRR shows that for every unit increase in the perceived adequacy of the 
response to a natural disaster is expected to increase the rate of subsequent terrorism in 
Turkey by 1.074 times while holding the other variables constant in the model (p<0.05). 
Consequently, this thesis does not find support for hypothesis 1b that predicted that the 
perceived adequacy of the response to a natural disaster would be negatively related to 
subsequent terrorism within Turkey. 
  
6 One of the key questions posed by this thesis concerned how long the lag would be between the 
occurrence of a natural disaster and the influence that it would have on subsequent terrorism. In order to 
evaluate this, a series of Autoregressive Poisson regressions were run using between 0 and 12 lags, 
sequentially. This sensitivity analysis was run for all models that are discussed, and the complete findings 
are presented in Appendix A. Based on this analysis, it was concluded that the most appreciable impact of 




                                                 
Table 2: Autoregressive Poisson Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors for 
Lagged Natural Disasters and Adequacy of Response on Terrorism 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2a Hypothesis 2b 
 All Terrorism Kurdish Terrorism Non-Kurdish Terrorism 
 𝜷 (SE) 𝜷 (SE) 𝜷 (SE) 
Disaster    
Adequacy 0.0714 (0.036) 0.170 (0.048) 0.044 (0.042) 
Killed 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
GDP (Billions) 0.0001 (0.0005) 0.003** (0.0001) -0.001 (0.0008) 
Population (Millions) -0.278** (0.322) -0.387** (0.428) -0.182 (0.408) 
GFCE 0.486** (0.043) 0.491** (0.058) 0.492** (0.053) 
Foreign Investment 0.205 (0.116) 0.197 (0.149) 0.246 (0.146) 
DAC -0.205** (0.078) -0.633** (0.113) -0.037 (0.091) 
Unemployment (%) 0.011 (0.012) 0.071** (0.019) -0.020 (0.012) 
Election Year 0.210** (0.061) 0.347 (0.061) 0.347 (0.061) 
Constant 12.634 (2.222) 15.890 (2.840) 7.508 (2.853) 
°p≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01 (one-tailed tests). 
Seeking to explore whether the relationship between the perceived adequacy of a 
natural disaster had a varying impact on different types of terrorism (hypotheses 2), 
models 3 and 4 in Table 2 test this relationship on Kurdish (hypothesis 2a) and non-
Kurdish terrorism (hypothesis 2b) respectively. This thesis did not find support for 
hypothesis 2a as the coefficient is opposite in expectation, however with every unit 
increase in the perceived adequacy of the response to a natural disaster was found to lead 
to an expected increase in the rate of subsequent Kurdish terrorism in Turkey by 1.185 
times for Kurdish terrorism. Once again however, had a two-tailed hypothesis been used, 
this result would have been statistically significant (p<0.001). The findings for hypothesis 
2b however were in line with those predicted, as non-Kurdish terrorism is unrelated to the 




The final two hypotheses offered by this thesis are concerned with observing 
whether the impact of the adequacy of the response to a natural disaster upon terrorism 
varied geographically within Turkey. Focusing upon natural disasters that occurred 
within southeastern Turkey, Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 contain the estimated coefficients 
and the robust standard errors for Kurdish and Non-Kurdish Terrorism within Turkey 
between 1987 and 2011. This thesis found support for hypothesis 3a, with the perceived 
adequacy of the response to a natural disaster that occurred in the southeast in the 
previous month being found to be negatively related to Kurdish terrorism (p<0.001). As 
such, this thesis finds support for hypothesis that the perceived adequacy to a natural 
disaster that occurred in the southeast of Turkey would be negatively related to 
subsequent Kurdish terrorism. It appears that for natural disasters occurring in the 
southeast of Turkey that the rate of terrorism decreased by a factor of 0.818 for every 
one-unit increase in the perceived adequacy of the government’s response.  
As predicted by hypothesis 3b, Model 2 indicated that the adequacy of the 
perceived response to a natural disaster had no evident impact on non-Kurdish Terrorism 
once the location of the disaster was included in the model. When looking at all of the 
terrorism that occurred in Turkey however, the adequacy of the response that occurred in 
the previous month was statistically significant within Model 3, and was positively 




Table 3: Autoregressive Poisson Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors for 
Lagged Adequacy of Response on Terrorism 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Hypotheses 3a & 4a 
Kurdish Terrorism 
 






 𝜷 (SE) 𝜷 (SE) 𝜷 (SE) 
Southeast Adequacy -0.200** (0.047) 0.015 (0.042) 0.074* (0.036) 
Non-Southeast 
Adequacy 
0.139* (0.077) -0.011 (0.049) -0.045 (0.049) 
Southeast Previous 12 
Months 
-0.061* (0.032) 0.009 (0.023) 0.006 (0.022) 
Non-Southeast Previous 
12 Months 
0.045* (0.21) 0.002 (0.016) 0.018 (0.014) 
Killed -0.004 (0.009) 0.0006 (0.0009) 0.0003 (0.0007) 
GDP (Billions) 0.004** (0.0006) -0.0001° (0.0007) 0.001° (0.0005) 
Population (Millions) -0.384** (0.042) -0.180** (0.043) -0.282** (0.033) 
GFCE 0.411** (0.061) 0.497** (0.059) 0.460** (0.047) 
Foreign Investment 0.154 (0.143) 0.279° (0.149) 0.191 (0.114) 
DAC -0.692** (0.111) -0.035 (0.097) -0.342** (0.080) 
Unemployment (%) 0.694** (0.018) -0.019 (0.013) 0.010  (0.012) 
Election Year 0.743** (0.235) 0.813** (0.165) 0.771** (0.151) 
Constant 16.770 (2.823) 7.514 (2.995) 13.362 (2.279) 
°p≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01 (one-tailed tests). 
In line with the predictions of hypothesis 4a, the adequacy of the response to 
natural disaster was positively related to subsequent Kurdish terrorism (p<0.04). This 
result suggests that for every unit increase in the perceived adequacy of the response to a 
natural disaster that occurred outside of the southeast is expected to increase the rate of 
subsequent Kurdish terrorism in Turkey by 1.149 times while holding the other variables 
constant in the model. Support was also found for hypothesis 4b that posited that natural 
disasters that occurred outside of southeastern Turkey would be unrelated to subsequent 




It should finally be noted that there is also evidence that the better the perceived 
adequacy of the responses to a natural disaster over the previous 12 months outside of the 
southeast of Turkey were associated with an increase in the rate of Kurdish terrorism 
(IRR=1.046, p<0.05), and that responses to a natural disaster over the previous 12 months 
within the southeast of Turkey were associated with an decrease in the rate of Kurdish 




Expanding upon the previous research connecting natural disasters to terrorism, 
this study was the first to investigate whether the perceived adequacy of a state’s 
response to a natural disaster impacts future acts of terrorism. No support was found for 
the first hypothesis that predicted a negative relationship between the perceived adequacy 
of the response to a natural disaster and subsequent terrorism. Consequently, this thesis 
provides evidence that it is the perceived adequacy of the response to a natural disaster 
that impacts subsequent acts of terrorism at the nation-level within Turkey.  
Positing that ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations are more reactive to the 
adequacy of a government’s response to a natural disaster, the findings from this thesis 
also indicate that there were observable differences between Kurdish and non-Kurdish 
terrorism within Turkey during this period. Seeking to observe whether the perceived 
adequacy of the response to a natural disaster had a differential impact on Kurdish 
terrorism compared to non-Kurdish terrorism within Turkey, this thesis failed to find 
support for a negative relationship between perceived adequacy and subsequent Kurdish 
terrorism at the nation level. It was found however that there was no observable 
relationship between subsequent non-Kurdish terrorism and the perceived adequacy of 
the response to a natural disaster in line with the original hypothesis. There was a positive 
association that was observed between the perceived adequacy of the government’s 
response and Kurdish terrorism had a two-tailed hypothesis been used. Although this 
finding should be understood in light of the more flexible models discussed below, these 
post-hoc explorations do suggest that the relationship between natural disasters and the 
subsequent response had a different impacts on ethno-nationalist terrorism within Turkey. 
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Although not predicted by this study, it should also be noted that there was also 
evidence found that non-Kurdish terrorism was affected by the perception of the 
government’s response to a natural disaster after the first month. Sensitivity tests 
(Appendix A) revealed that the relationship between the perceived adequacy of response 
and non-Kurdish terrorism was more volatile compared to Kurdish terrorism, and was 
negatively related to the adequacy of the response after two and five months, and 
positively related after ten months. Thus, beyond ethno-nationalist terrorism, this thesis 
also provides some evidence to suggest that other types of terrorism were also influenced 
by the response to a natural disaster within Turkey. Consequently, it appears that both the 
magnitude and duration of the impact of the government’s response varied across 
different types of terrorism at the nation-level. While these findings disappeared after the 
location of the natural disaster was taken into account, this avenue of research also merits 
further analysis within Turkey and other contexts. 
The ability to differentiate between natural disasters that occur within different 
regions of Turkey was found to be especially important by this study. After accounting 
for the region where the natural disaster took place, Kurdish terrorism in the month 
following a natural disaster was inversely related to the adequacy of the response to 
natural disasters occurring within southeastern Turkey. As such, it is evident within these 
data that responses to a natural disaster in the southeast that are perceived as adequate 
were associated with a reduction in the rate of Kurdish terrorism within Turkey. Further, 
this thesis also finds evidence to suggest that adequate responses outside of the southeast 
were associated with increases in Kurdish terrorism in the following month. While this 
finding is plausible given the previous literature suggesting that Turkey has previously 
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redesignated resources from the southeastern Kurdish areas to fund these relief efforts 
(Kinzer, 1999), further research is still required in order to isolate whether these increases 
in terrorism are indeed a product of the redistribution of resources. As such, this thesis 
finds evidence that in addition to quelling the rationale for engaging in acts of terrorism, 
terrorism may exist as a response that attempts to undermine or distract citizens from the 
political gains that come from a successful response to a natural disaster in other areas.  
Further, as the initial models that combined all disasters indicated that there was a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the adequacy of the government 
response and Kurdish terrorism in the following month (assuming a two-tailed 
hypothesis), the implications from these data would be very different had this sub-
national geographic variation been ignored in the models used by this study. As such, this 
study finds strong evidence to suggest that observing these impacts at the national level is 
insufficient to capture the nature of the relationship between natural disasters and various 
forms of subsequent terrorism. Non-Kurdish terrorism appeared to be unconnected to the 
response to a natural disaster that occurred in the previous month across all geographic 
levels as predicted. However, this relationship still requires replication in other settings 
before concluding that the relationship between the perceived adequacy of a natural 
disaster and subsequent terrorism is only observable for ethno-national terrorism. 
 As the above methods only explore one of many ways of observing geographic 
variation within a nation, other methods of capturing geographic variation should also be 
used in subsequent research. Different levels of geographic aggregation may be able to 
further ascertain whether the observed relationships were a product of aggregation, or 
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whether these impacts are felt differentially depending on where the disaster occurred. It 
is also recommended that future research employ finer geographic units of analysis 
attempt to also control for factors such as terrain and access to resources such as water, 
hospitals, and education that also impact the relationship between natural disasters and 
subsequent terrorism. Further, the ability to observe this relationship was also limited as 
control data was only available that captured annual variation. 
As the specificity of the existing grievances between the Kurdish people and the 
Turkish government also limit the generalizability of these findings, this study on its own 
should not be seen as sufficient to suggest that the link between natural disasters and 
subsequent terrorism only exists through the adequacy of the government’s response for 
individual nations. For example, the impact on subsequent terrorism may be more 
pronounced if the natural disaster destroyed vital public infrastructure such as electricity 
grids, access to water, or hospitals. Despite this, this thesis can inform future policy 
within Turkey, and possibly other nations that have marginalized populations who have 
high levels of geographic concentration. Based on the above findings, it appears that 
when the state is perceived to have not met its obligation to its populace in a time of 
crisis, groups might resort to terrorism. With this in mind, particularly when grievances 
exist between a state and a marginalized and geographically concentrated population, this 
evidence suggests that the response to any natural disaster has implications for 
subsequent terrorism from ethno-nationalist groups, as adequate responses outside of the 
southeast also led to higher rates of terrorism. As such, in addition to the practical 
response to a natural disaster, it may be beneficial for a state to ensure that a strong public 
message is composed that is sensitive to the grievances of marginalized groups after a 
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natural disaster. Although untested by this thesis, it is believed that without an adequate 
response, attempts to sway public perception in such a manner would also result in the 
aggravation of existing grievances. 
This thesis was limited as it was unable to observe and control for monthly 
variation in the economic and demographic profile of Turkey. Although yearly variation 
in these correlates of terrorism was included in all models, any potential interactions 
between these factors and the perceived adequacy of a government’s response to a natural 
disaster were unable to be detected in this thesis. While data availability issues are a 
common problem faced by researches seeking to study this region of the globe, this 
limitation is not trivial given the central role that economic concerns may play in 
mediating or exacerbating the relationship between a government and its people. Even in 
cases where data were available, such as for financial estimates for the damage incurred 
from a natural disaster, these data were unable to be incorporated due to the presence of 
systematically missing data and estimates that were unable to be confirmed by multiple 
sources. Consequently, this thesis highlights the need for subsequent research exploring 
how fluctuation in the financial resources available to the government may further inform 
the relationship observed in this thesis. 
The current method used for estimated the perceived adequacy of government 
responses to a natural disaster is also only one of many methods that may be used to 
estimate public perceptions of this phenomenon. Although there is evidence to suggest 
that the lead sentences that were used for this purpose are able to gauge public perception 
particularly within the context of terrorism (Norris and Kern, 2013), the present method 
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was unable to discern between attitudes held by Kurdish and non-Kurdish people within 
Turkey. Beyond triangulating the results obtained by present method, this thesis also 
recommends that methods that are able to capture sub-national variation with regard to 
the perception of the response to a natural disaster be incorporated into the methods 
employed by future studies. For example, interviews or consistent polling of the public’s 
perceptions of these issues would be invaluable for this purpose. 
The findings presented here further affirm the extant literature that suggests that a 
natural disaster may also be a catalyst for improved relations between a state and its 
constituency (Hall and Landreth, 1975; Perry and Lindell, 2003; Kaniasty and Norris, 
2004). As such, beyond minimizing the direct harms that are incurred from a population 
impacted by a natural disaster, a timely and well-planned government response that does 
not detract from other vital public services may also help to reduce the rate of terrorism in 
the following month. Specifically, observing whether these findings are generalizable to 
terrorism regarding the Saharawi within Morocco, the Kashmiri within India, the Moros 
in the Philippines, and the Afars people within Eritrea, which also have high levels of 
geographic concentration comparable to the Kurdish people, remains an important next 
step for this body of research (Natali, 2005; Hoffman, 2006, MAR, 2013). 
In addition to causing widespread damage and engendering fear within a given 
society (Peek and Sutton, 2003; Flynn, 2008), the findings in this thesis suggest that 
natural disasters also impact the rate at which ethno-nationalist terrorism occurs in the 
following month. Perhaps a state’s perceived failure in this duty to its populace can 
magnify the disaster’s economic, political, and social costs, triggering negative 
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consequences for a state and its citizenry including terrorism (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos, 
and Tarlow, 1999; Perry and Lindell, 2003; Waugh, 2006). Particularly in nations that 
affirm that their government has a responsibility for the wellbeing of its populace, how a 
state responds to a natural disaster may have both positive and negative impacts on 
subsequent terrorism. Although it is unclear whether this impact also extends to other 
forms of terrorism within Turkey such as that committed by Islamic and Leftist groups, 
this thesis has demonstrated that both the location and perception of the response both 
influence the rates at which terrorism occurs over a 12 month period. Further, it is evident 
that this relationship is separate from the presence of natural disasters. Consequently, it 
appears based upon the data used within this study that the relationship between natural 
disasters and terrorism varies over the course of a year, varies geographically within a 
nation, and exists through the perceived adequacy of the response. 
Drawing upon these findings, it appears that governments play an important role 
in the response to a natural disaster that is valued by their populace, and that may also 
mitigate existing tensions and lead to reductions in terrorism committed by groups whose 
constituency resides in the impacted area. Further, there is some evidence to suggest that 
this relationship also extends to the perceived adequacy of the response elsewhere in the 
nation. While future studies will be required in order to establish whether this is due to 
the removal of vital resources from the constituency of the terrorist group or due to some 
other factor, it is evident that the adequacy of the response to a natural disaster places a 
government in a unique position to either mitigate or exacerbate the underlying 
motivations for terrorism.  
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7 Appendix A 
 
One of the key questions posed by this thesis concerned how long the lag would 
be between the occurrence of a natural disaster and the influence that it would have on 
subsequent terrorism. In order to evaluate this, a series of Autoregressive Poisson 
regressions were run using between 0 and 12 lags, sequentially in separate models, in 
order to observe whether this relationship was sensitive to the number of months allowed 
for a lag and to establish the appropriate model to test the hypotheses raised by this 
thesis. This sensitivity analysis was run for all models that were discussed within the 
results section, and the findings are discussed in this appendix. 
Focusing firstly on the relationship between the perceived adequacy of the 
Turkish Government’s response to a natural disaster and subsequent terrorism, it was 
evident that this relationship varied markedly across the lags that were observed. While 
the coefficients that were produced from this series of autoregressive Poisson regressions 
were smaller in magnitude compared to those produced above (-0.041 − 0.118 compared 
to -0.187 − 0.190), the regressions that used one monthly lag and ten monthly lags for the 
adequacy of response would have both been found to be statistically different from zero 
within the model had a two-tailed hypothesis been used (Figure 11). Although once again 
the finding for ten months should be viewed with caution (Box and Jenkins, 1970), the 
finding for one lag was observed across a number of model specifications and appears to 
be fairly robust. It should however be emphasized that the coefficients for both one and 
ten monthly lags were in the opposite direction to that hypothesized. While not in line 
with the predicted relationship, this finding does suggest that there is a relationship within 
Turkey between the perceived adequacy of the Government’s response to a natural 
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disaster and terrorism in the following month at the nation level. The average coefficient 
that was observed was 0.010. 
 
Figure 11: Coefficients for Adequacy of Government Response on Turkish 
Terrorism - 0-12 lags   
 
As the above models treated all terrorist actions as being homogenous, this 
specification can be seen to not allow for variation in the relationship across terrorist 
organization types. As such, the following models differentiated between Kurdish 
terrorism and non-Kurdish terrorism in order to examine whether this relationship was 
different for ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations when compared to other terrorist 
organizations within Turkey. As with the above model, a positive and statistically 
significant relationship (had a two-tailed hypothesis been used) was observed at a lag of 
one month for Kurdish terrorism and negatively at 11 months (Figure 12). Although once 
again this finding for a lag of one month is the opposite of that predicted, this finding 






























































response had on terrorism in the following month. Further, this finding can also be seen 
to further indicate that there is variability in this relationship over the course of a year. As 
the observed coefficients at all other points did not vary greatly in magnitude from zero (-
0.024 – 0.055, ?̅? = 0.017 for all lags), this observed relationship appears to be specific to 
a limited number of monthly lags for Kurdish terrorism. 
 
 
Figure 12: Coefficients for Adequacy of Government Response on Kurdish 
Terrorism - 0-12 lags   
 
The relationship between the perceived adequacy of the Turkish government’s 
response upon non-Kurdish terrorism was observed to be more volatile compared to 
Kurdish terrorism across the 12 monthly lags between 1987 and 2011 (Figure 13). 
Despite this increased variation in the coefficients across the observed lags, the average 
coefficient was smaller in magnitude than any of the previously run models (?̅? = 0.003). 
Consistent with the initial model that investigated all Turkish terrorist events, a positive 































































however, a negative and statistically significant coefficient was yielded for both two and 
five months. While once again these findings deviate from the originally postulated 
hypothesis that non-Kurdish terrorism would be unrelated to the perceived adequacy of 
the government response, these findings further suggest that factors related to, but 
beyond, the presence of a natural disaster in Turkey impact both Kurdish and non-
Kurdish terrorism within the Turkish nation. It further appears that these two models 
suggest that not only is there variation in the direction of the relationship between the 
perceived government adequacy and subsequent terrorism across types of terrorism in 
Turkey, but also that the length of time between these impacts also occur after varying 
periods following a natural disaster for Kurdish and non-Kurdish terrorism. 
 
 
Figure 13: Coefficients for Adequacy of Government Response on Non-Kurdish 
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